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China’s listed companies have two-tier boards comprising of a supervisory board and a board of directors. 
The supervisory board has the responsibility to oversee and monitor the board of directors. Similarly, 
the role of the independent non-executive directors (INEDs) is to advise and monitor directors. In this 
paper, we investigate the main board structure hypotheses namely the scope of operations, monitoring and 
negotiation hypotheses for a sample of Chinese Initial Public Offerings floated on both the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. Our results provide evidence to support the three hypotheses. Interestingly, 
we find that the larger the size of the board of directors, the larger the supervisory board size. Moreover, 
we find that the higher the proportion of INEDs, the smaller the supervisory board size and this implies 
that INEDs are perhaps a substituting mechanism for the supervisors’ monitoring role. Finally, we argue 
that as the Chinese governance structure combines both the German and the Anglo-Saxon models, this 
creates a conflict between the two boards with respect to the monitoring role. Our results, therefore call 
for a comprehensive reform in the Chinese governance mechanism. 
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1. Introduction 
Chinese listed companies have dual boards namely a supervisory board and a board of directors. 
However, China’s dual board structure differs from the two-tier board mechanism in continental 
Europe in which the supervisory board appoints the directors on the management board and that 
management board comprises only of executive directors. According to the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in China 20011 (hereafter ‘the Code’) issued by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC 2001a), there is no hierarchical relationship between 
the two boards and both boards report to the shareholders. Directors and supervisors are usually 
nominated by controlling shareholders and institutional investors but are eventually appointed 
by the shareholders. In practice, the state plays a significant role in appointing directors and 
supervisors on the supervisory board (Kato and Long 2006; Firth et al. 2009). 
The board of directors comprises of executive, non-executive (NEDs) and independent non- 
executive directors (INEDs). The main responsibility of the INEDs is to monitor and advise 
directors and to protect the overall interests of the company and minority shareholders in par- 
ticular. On the other hand, the supervisory board has the responsibility to monitor the acts of 
directors and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and to review the financial affairs of the com- 
pany. Therefore, we argue that there might be a conflict in roles between the supervisory board 
and the INEDs and hence it is interesting to investigate the monitoring hypothesis and the main 
determinants of the board of directors and the supervisory board structure for Chinese companies. 
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The Chinese economy has an increasing power worldwide. There has been a remarkable 
growth in the Chinese Initial Public Offering (IPO) market compared with other emerging mar- 
kets. For instance, in 2007, China was declared the top country with respect to the number of 
IPO new issues2 (Xu and Oh 2011). However, in 2012, there was a sharp decline (62%) in funds 
raised through IPOs; therefore, the CSRC suspended the approval of new IPOs in October 2012.3 
We argue that little is known about IPOs’ board structure overall and the Chinese IPOs in par- 
ticular, as the existing literature tends to focus on the US (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Boone 
et al. 2007). 
Our study addresses these limitations. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first paper to investigate the main board structure hypotheses, the determinants of the two-tier 
board structure for Chinese IPOs and the interrelationship and the potential conflict between 
the two boards with respect to the monitoring role. Studying IPOs’ board structure is inter- 
esting and our data set of young companies is unique as we can monitor their evolution over 
time (Boone et al. 2007). On the other hand, IPOs are subject to substantial changes in gover- 
nance mechanisms post-IPO as they are expected to adopt more value-maximising governance 
characteristics (Baker and Gompers 2003). Therefore, we argue that studying the determinants 
of IPOs’ board structure is timely and may offer new insights to the literature on corporate 
governance. 
Motivated by Baker and Gompers (2003), Boone et al. (2007) and Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2003), this paper investigates the main board structure hypotheses namely the scope of oper- 
ations, monitoring and negotiation and the determinants of the board of directors’ size, the 
supervisory board size in addition to the interrelationships between the two boards for a sam- 
ple of Chinese IPOs floated in both the Shanghai (SSE) and Shenzhen stock exchanges (SZSE) 
over the period 1999–2009 tracked for at least four years since the IPO year until 2012. This 
allows us to measure the evolution of corporate boards over the life cycle of a company. More- 
over, since the influence of board structure on financial performance has been investigated in the 
literature in different institutional settings (e.g. Jensen 1993; Yermack 1996), our paper extends 
this debate in the corporate governance literature and investigates the board structure-financial 
performance nexus for Chinese IPOs. We believe that companies should appoint experienced 
and talented directors to the board of directors so that they are able to achieve shareholders’ 
objectives and hence boost the economy. 
Using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and propensity score matching 
(PSM) techniques, we find evidence of the scope of operations hypothesis and that boards of 
directors of more complex companies tend to be larger. Interestingly we find that the higher the 
proportion of INEDs, the smaller the supervisory board size and this implies that INEDs are 
perhaps a substituting mechanism for the supervisors’ monitoring role. More interestingly, we 
find that the state – as a controlling shareholder – may influence and enforce the appointment 
of supervisors on the supervisory boards to carry out the monitoring role. This argument is con- 
sistent with Dahya et al. (2003) as they argue that supervisors in reality act as the voice of the 
government and the ruling party. 
We also find consistent results with Jensen (1986) and Boone et al. (2007) with respect to  
the monitoring hypothesis as the greater the private benefits of directors the larger the board of 
directors’ size. Moreover, the higher the monitoring costs the smaller the board size. Therefore, 
board structure is the outcome of the relationship between directors’ private benefits and the cost 
of monitoring. Finally, we find consistent results with the negotiation hypothesis, as the Chinese 
board independence is determined as a trade-off between CEOs’ influence and the constraints on 
this influence. 
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Our paper has clear policy implications for the Chinese regulator. We argue that supervisory 
boards in China play no significant role in corporate governance and have no actual power to 
oversee and monitor the board of directors as intended and stated in the Chinese Company Law 
(Clarke 2006). This is mainly due to the potential conflict in roles between supervisors and 
INEDs on the board of directors and the overall overlap of duties between the two boards. This 
dilutes the power of both boards and increases directors’ and supervisors’ compensation schemes 
(CFA Institute 2007). Therefore, the governance mechanism followed by Chinese companies is 
a quasi-two-tier structure (CFA Institute 2007). 
Our results reveal the need for the regulator to reconsider the roles of either INEDs or the 
supervisory board members for, at least, listed companies or non-state-owned companies within 
a comprehensive reform of the Chinese governance mechanism. This is due to the clear conflict 
in the monitoring role between the supervisory board members and the INEDs on the board of 
directors. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the 
institutional background and board structure dynamics in China. Section 3 presents the literature 
review and hypotheses development. Sections 4 and 5 present a description of our dataset and 
the empirical modelling respectively. Section 6 presents the results of our empirical analysis and 
finally, we discuss the implications of the results in Section 7. 
 
2. Institutional background 
Chinese listed companies have a two-tier (dual) governance structure that comprises a super- 
visory board/committee and a board of directors. The two boards are independent as there is  
no hierarchical relationship between them. The Chinese government and the ruling party influ- 
ence the appointment of the directors and supervisors on the supervisory board (Kato and Long 
2006). Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) find that 27% of CEOs of the newly privatised companies 
are politically connected and this leads to 18% lower stock returns than IPOs with non-politically 
connected CEOs. Firth et al. (2009) argue that politically connected directors do not necessarily 
have sufficient experience and managerial know-how. 
According to the Company Law (2013, Article 108) and the Code, the size of the board of 
directors of a joint stock limited company ranges from 3 to 13 directors.4 The board of directors 
should also include independent directors who may not hold any other positions in the listed 
company. Their main responsibilities are to protect the overall interests of the company and 
minority shareholders in particular. Independent directors should carry out their duties indepen- 
dently away from any influence of the company’s major shareholders, or any other interested 
parties. Moreover, independent directors have the power to postpone the board of directors meet- 
ing or to postpone the discussion on a particular matter when two or more independent directors 
find that the materials provided by the board of directors before the meeting are not adequate or 
unclear. 
Finally, the supervisory board consists of at least three supervisors, one of whom represents 
shareholders and another democratically elected employee representative (apart from the General 
Manager and the Chief Financial Officer) (Article 51 of the Company Law 2013). The board of 
supervisors has the following authorities amongst others:5 
 
to examine the company’s financial affairs; to supervise the execution of company duties by the 
directors and the senior officers and to recommend the removal of directors and senior officers that 
violate laws, administrative regulations, the articles of association of the company or the resolutions 
of general meeting; ... .. (Article 53 of the Company Law 2013) 
4 H. Farag and C. Mallin 
 
 
Supervisors should have professional knowledge and experience in law and accounting. The 
members and the structure of the supervisory board shall ensure its capability to independently 
and efficiently conduct its supervision of directors, managers and other senior management per- 
sonnel and to supervise and examine the company’s financial matters, (The Code, Article 64). 
The Code also states that directors/supervisors should be nominated by controlling shareholders 
based on their professional knowledge. However, appointing directors in state-owned compa- 
nies is influenced by both central and provincial governments to ensure companies’ compliance 
with government policies (Chang and Wong 2009; Li and Tang 2010; Pessarossi and Weill 
2013). 
Yang, Chi, and Young (2011) argue that the supervisory boards are unable to influence the 
decisions made by the board of directors as supervisors usually have less experience and are not 
qualified enough to monitor the board of directors. We argue that this may lead to the appointment 
of less profiled – but loyal – directors in state-owned companies and hence undermines a major 
internal corporate governance mechanism (Pessarossi and Weill 2013; Farag and Mallin 2016). 
 
3. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The literature on board structure has largely investigated three main hypotheses namely the 
scope of operations, monitoring and negotiation hypotheses (Boone et al. 2007). In this section 
we present the literature on the three board structure hypotheses and the main determinants  
and dynamics of the unique Chinese board structure. Finally, we present the literature on the 
relationship between board structure and financial performance. 
 
3.1 The scope of operations hypothesis 
Companies with different product lines and those operating in different segments or geograph- 
ical areas usually have high growth opportunities and tend to be more complex (Boone et al. 
2007; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2008). As companies grow and expand, they might need more 
directors with specific expertise and knowledge to help oversee managers’ performance (Yer- 
mack 1996; Bhagat and Black 1999; Agrawal and Knoeber 2001; Lehn, Patro, and Zhao 2009). 
Therefore, the scope of operations hypothesis states that large and complex companies need 
larger boards to better perform the monitoring and advising roles (Fama and Jensen 1983; Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen 2008). 
The human capital theory states that larger boards may have more diverse opinions and hence 
better quality decisions are likely to be made (Sah and Stiglitz 1991). However, larger boards 
are subject to more agency problems. Therefore, they are associated with a higher proportion of 
INEDs to better monitor their scope of operations (Boone et al. 2007). Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2008) find that complex companies have greater advising requirements and hence have larger 
boards with a higher proportion of INEDs. Jensen (1993) argues that large boards with more than 
seven or eight directors may have communication and coordination problems and hence have less 
effective monitoring and advising roles and this enables CEOs to influence and control the board 
easily. Yermack (1996) finds that the smaller the board of directors’ size, the more effective the 
monitoring and advising roles. Cheng (2008) argues that it usually takes more negotiation and 
hence a longer time to reach a final decision in a larger board. 
We agree with Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) as they conclude that board structure is a trade- 
off between the costs and benefits of a board’s monitoring and advising roles. Therefore, based 
on the scope of operations hypothesis, we expect that there should be a positive relationship 
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between the scope and complexity of the firm’s operations proxied by company size and both 
board size and independence. 
Few studies have been conducted in the Chinese setting. Chen and Al-Najjar (2012) find 
that firm complexity drives board size whereas regulations mainly drive board independence. 
Moreover, they find a negative relationship between board independence and both supervisory 
board size and the proportion of state ownership. However, no other studies have investigated 
the determinants of the supervisory board size in China. Therefore, we are trying to fill this gap 
in the literature. 
We argue that the role of the supervisory board is controversial. Using interview data, Dahya 
et al. (2003) find that the Chinese supervisory boards in reality act as an honoured guest, a 
friendly advisor, or a censored watchdog. Therefore, they argue that there is a need to strengthen 
the functioning and independence of the supervisory boards in China. Using the grounded theory 
methodology, Xiao, Dahya, and Lin (2004) find that the role of the supervisory boards is limited 
overall and that the main determinants of the supervisory board role are the influence of the 
Communist Party and the government, the role of independent directors and the power of the 
board of directors. Finally, they argue that the existence of independent directors affects the 
future of the supervisory boards. 
Board structure and governance characteristics have not been a significant area of research  
in the IPO literature. Boone et al. (2007) track the developments in corporate board structure 
for IPOs in the US and find evidence to support the scope of operations hypothesis. They find   
a positive relationship between both company size and age and both board size and indepen- 
dence. They argue that more complex companies may need larger and more independent boards. 
Chancharat, Krishnamurti, and Tian (2012) find an association between board independence and 
the survival of Australian IPOs. They conclude that the optimal board structure is mainly deter- 
mined by company and industry characteristics. Moreover, they argue that executive directors 
may also enhance board effectiveness where INEDs face higher information processing costs 
(Chancharat, Krishnamurti, and Tian 2012). Below, we formulate our first hypothesis; however, 
as most of previous literature focuses on different settings, the results could differ from previous 
research: 
 
H1: The greater the degree of company complexity the larger its board size and independence. 
 
3.2 The monitoring hypothesis 
Complex and more diversified companies may need specific expertise in monitoring manage- 
ment and this may increase monitoring costs (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2008; Linck, Netter, 
and Yang 2008). Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) argue that the higher the monitoring cost, the 
smaller the board size and independence. The monitoring hypothesis states that corporate busi- 
ness environment has an influence on monitoring activities (Boone et al. 2007). Gillan, Hartzell, 
and Starks (2004) argue that in noisy environments, for example, high growth, companies tend to 
monitor less compared with less noisy business environments (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen (2008) find that fast growth companies may have smaller boards and a lower 
proportion of INEDs due to the high monitoring costs. They argue that uncertainty increases 
monitoring costs and thus companies operating in noisy environments rely on insiders as they 
have company-specific knowledge. 
Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) find that companies with greater information asymmetry have 
smaller boards and a high proportion of executive directors. Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2009) find 
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a negative relationship between board size and market-to-book value as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. Boone et al. (2007) and Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) argue that the larger the 
board size the less effective the monitoring role due to free-riding problems. The monitoring 
hypothesis predicts that companies tend to have large boards when the benefits from appoint- 
ing additional directors outweigh the monitoring costs and this mainly depends on the company 
characteristics (Boone et al. 2007). Therefore, Boone et al. (2007) argue that board size and inde- 
pendence are positively correlated with directors’ private benefits and negatively correlated with 
monitoring costs. 
The Chinese experience on the other hand provides interesting insights with respect to the 
monitoring hypothesis. It is well documented in the literature that the supervisory board is 
unlikely to have an effective monitoring role as in reality it acts as the voice of the govern- 
ment and the ruling party (Dahya et al. 2003). Therefore, the CSRC issued guidelines on the 
introduction of independent directors in August 2001 to enhance the monitoring role (CSRC 
2001b). Wang (2008) argues that INEDs have made improvements to the governance mechanism 
in China compared with the role of the supervisory board. 
However, Lu (2005) argues that INEDs have no actual role given the insiders’ influence which 
does not provide a healthy environment for INEDs to exercise their monitoring role over direc- 
tors. Li et al. (2012) find a performance gap with respect to the control and strategic roles of 
INEDs due to the lack of their time commitment, lack of objectivity and limited expertise. There- 
fore, we argue that the potential conflict in roles between INEDs and the supervisory board may 
influence the overall board effectiveness. Based on the above discussion we formulate our second 
and third hypotheses. 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between directors’ private benefits and both board size and 
independence. 
 
H3: There is a negative relationship between monitoring costs and both board size and 
independence. 
 
 
3.3 The negotiation hypothesis 
Successful CEOs have bargaining power and an influence on appointing insiders and affiliated 
INEDs (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Boone et al. 2007). Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue 
that CEOs in profitable companies may use their power to influence the appointment of loyal 
INEDs. However, the presence of venture capitalists (VCs) and other institutional investors 
might impose constraints on CEOs’ power (Boone et al. 2007). Boone et al. (2007) find a neg- 
ative and significant relationship between CEO power proxied by both CEO’s share ownership 
and tenure and board independence; however, they find that the latter is positively related to the 
constraints on CEO’s influence. Therefore, the negotiation hypothesis states that there is a neg- 
ative relationship between CEO’s power and the proportion of INEDs; however, the proportion 
of INEDs is positively related to the constraints on CEO’s influence. 
Similarly, Baker and Gompers (2003) investigate the main determinants of board structure for 
VC-backed IPOs and find a negative and significant relationship between CEO power (proxied 
by tenure and voting control) and the proportion of INEDs. However, they find that the proportion 
of INEDs is positively associated with the power of outside investors, for example, VCs and that 
board structure is the outcome of the bargaining power between CEOs and outside investors. 
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Raheja (2005) finds that board structure influences the information flow and that an optimal 
board size and composition depend on company and directors’ characteristics. 
The Chinese board structure is a rich environment that has unique interrelationships between 
CEOs and INEDs. Ma and Khanna (2015) investigate the role of INEDs and find that as  
INEDs ‘feel indebted for being offered a director position’, they usually offer their support     
to top management. Wang  (2008) claims that INEDs have made a limited contribution to      
the Chinese corporate governance and that there should be a fundamental regulatory reform    
to enhance both the overall board effectiveness and the relationship between the board of 
directors and the supervisory board. Furthermore, Wang (2008) argues that political con- 
nections on the two boards play a fundamental role in shaping the relationships between 
insiders and outsiders. Based on the above discussion, we formulate our fourth and fifth 
hypotheses. 
 
H4: There is a negative relationship between CEOs’ influence and the proportion of INEDs. 
 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the limitations on CEOs’ influence and the proportion 
of INEDs. 
 
3.4 Board structure and financial performance 
The influence of board structure on financial performance has been investigated in the litera- 
ture in different institutional settings. The results are largely in favour of a negative association 
between board size and financial performance. The proponents of the negative association 
between board size and financial performance argue that the larger the board size the greater 
the agency conflicts in addition to the coordination/communication problems (Jensen 1993). 
Yermack (1996) finds a negative and significant relationship between board size and company 
valuation. Using a large UK data set, Guest (2009) finds a negative and significant relationship 
between board size and financial performance due to communication problems amongst board 
directors. On the other hand, a few studies find a positive association between board size and 
financial performance, for example, Prevost, Rao, and Hossain (2002) in New Zealand. More- 
over, Li and Naughton (2007) find a positive and significant relationship between board size and 
IPOs’ short-term returns. 
Similarly, there has been a disagreement in the corporate governance literature on the impact 
of board independence. However, most of the existing studies largely find a positive relationship 
between board independence and financial performance. Cho and Rui (2009) find a positive and 
significant influence of the proportion of INEDs on financial performance in China. However, 
they find a negative and significant relationship between stock returns reaction to the reported 
earnings and the proportion of INEDs. Bezemer et al. (2014) claim that NEDs in two-tier boards 
may face some challenges including information asymmetries between the management and 
supervisory boards in the Netherlands. 
Omran (2009) finds a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of INEDs 
and financial performance post-IPO. He claims that post-IPO, the change in ownership struc- 
ture of state-owned companies is not effective  unless  the state gives  up  control  and  this  
may lead to an enhancement in financial performance post-IPO. Peng (2004) finds that the 
proportion of INEDs has little influence on financial performance measured by return on 
equity. Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007) find  that a higher proportion of INEDs may lead to   
greater earnings informativeness and this has a positive impact on investors’ confidence in 
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the financial statements. Based on the above discussion we formulate the following two 
hypotheses: 
 
H6: There is a negative relationship between both board of directors and supervisory board size and 
financial performance 
 
H7: There is a positive relationship between board of directors’ independence and financial 
performance 
 
4. Data and sample 
We collect data on non-financial Chinese IPOs floated in both the SSE and SZSE over the period 
1999–2009. We track the changes in board structure from the IPO launch year until 2012. Our 
final sample is an unbalanced panel that comprises of 892 IPOs and 8006 company-year obser- 
vations. Data are collected from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database which is designed and developed by GTA Information Technology Corporation. Our 
dependent variable is board structure proxied by board of directors’ size, supervisory board size 
and the proportion of INEDs on the board of directors. Board size is measured by the total 
number of directors/supervisors on both the board of directors and the supervisory board. Board 
independence is measured by the proportion of INEDs on the board of directors. 
Our independent variables are proxies for our three main hypotheses. We use company size, 
age and the leverage ratio as alternative proxies for the scope of operations hypothesis following 
Boone et al. (2007) and Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008). We use companies’ natural log of total 
assets as a proxy for company size. We also use companies’ age since IPO and since the establish- 
ment date as alternative proxies for company age. Moreover, we use the ratio of total debt to total 
assets as a proxy for leverage. The scope of operations hypothesis predicts a positive relationship 
between company size, age and debt/total assets ratio and both board size and independence. We 
also posit the same relationship applies with respect to the supervisory board size. 
The monitoring hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between directors’ private benefits’ 
proxies and both board size and independence. To test the monitoring hypothesis, we use both 
companies’ free cash flow and industry concentration as proxies for the potential private ben- 
efits following Boone et al. (2007), Guest (2008) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008). Free 
cash flow is measured as (earnings plus depreciation minus capital expenditures)/total assets. 
Industry concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index of industry sales. Jensen (1986) and 
Boone et al. (2007) argue that directors may use cash flow to achieve private benefits rather than 
maximising shareholders’ wealth. Moreover, directors in highly concentrated industries have the 
power to consume private benefits as they are less subject to market discipline (Boone et al. 
2007). 
The monitoring hypothesis also predicts a negative relationship between monitoring costs and 
both board size and independence. We argue that fast growing companies or those with higher 
market-to-book ratio and greater volatility have higher growth opportunities and higher moni- 
toring costs. Boone et al. (2007) argue that high volatility may imply high uncertainty about the 
future cash flows and hence complicates the mission of INEDs with respect to their monitoring 
role. Pathan (2009), Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) and Adams and Ferreira (2007) find that 
board structure reduces company uncertainty. Moreover, directors’ ownership mitigates agency 
conflicts that arise from high monitoring costs in some industries, for example, fast growth 
industries (Boone et al. 2007). 
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Therefore, we use the natural log of market-to-book ratio and the annualised standard devia- 
tion of daily stock returns as proxies for the cost of monitoring following Boone et al. (2007) 
and Linck, Netter, and Yang  (2008). Market-to-book ratio is calculated as (book value of    
debt + market value of equity)/book value of assets. Daily stock returns are calculated as the 
Table 1. Variables description. 
Variable Description 
 
Academics Proportion of academics on the board of directors 
B.size Board of directors’ size measured by the number of directors on the board of 
directors 
CEO Tenure Board experience defined as the length of time served on the current board 
CEOage CEO age measured by years 
CEOPolcon Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 
otherwise 
Coage Company age since its establishment year 
D/TA Total debt to total assets ratio as a proxy for leverage 
DirOwn Proportion of shares held by directors 
FCF Free cash flow to total assets ratio measured as (earnings plus depreciation minus 
capital expenditures)/total assets 
FemCEO Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is female and 0 otherwise 
Foreign Proportion of foreign directors on the board of directors 
Growth Dummy variable equals to one for fast growth companies and 0 otherwise 
HHI Industry concentration measured by the Herfindahl index. Herfindahl index 
constructed by the sales ratio of the companies in the same industry 
INED Percentage of INEDs 
IPO Dummy variable takes the value of 1 for IPOs and 0 for non-IPOs 
IPO*Post Reform Dummy variable takes the value of 1 for IPOs post stock split reform and 0 
otherwise 
L.B.size Lagged board of directors’ size 
L. INED Lagged proportion of INEDs 
L.R OA Lagged ROA 
L.S B.size Lagged supervisory board size 
LogMTB Natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio calculated as (book value of 
debt market value of equity)/book value of assets) 
LogTA Natural logarithm of company’s total assets as a proxy for company size 
PolconBoD Proportion of politically connected directors on the board of directors 
Post Reform Dummy variable takes the value of 1 post stock split reform and 0 otherwise 
ROA ROA calculated as (net profits financial expenses)/average total assets 
SB.size Supervisory board size measured by the number of supervisors on the supervisory 
board 
Sdsrtn Annualised standard deviation of daily stock returns for each IPO year. Daily stock 
returns are calculated as the first difference in the natural logarithm of the closing 
price over two consecutive trading days adjusted for dividends, rights issues, 
stock dividends, and stock splits 
StateOwn Percentage of State share ownership 
SupOwn Proportion of shares held by supervisors 
Tobin’s Q Q ratio measured by (market value of equity, the book value of debt and the book 
value of preferred stocks divided by the book value of total assets) 
VC Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the company is venture capital backed and 
0 otherwise 
Note: Data are collected from the CSMAR database which is designed and developed by GTA Information Technology 
Corporation. 
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first difference in the natural logarithm of the closing price over two consecutive trading days 
adjusted for dividends, rights issues, stock dividends and stock splits. We also use the proportion 
of directors’ ownership and a fast growth dummy that is equal to 1 for fast growth companies 
and 0 otherwise as proxies for the cost of monitoring. Therefore, according to the monitoring 
hypothesis, we expect a negative relationship between both board size and independence and 
the log of market-to-book ratio, the annualised standard deviation of daily stock returns, the fast 
growth dummy and directors’ ownership. 
The negotiation hypothesis predicts a negative association between the proportion of INEDs 
and the proxies for CEOs’ influence and a positive association with the constraints on their influ- 
ence (Boone et al. 2007). To test the negotiation hypothesis and whether board composition 
reflects the potential negotiation between CEOs and INEDs following Boone et al. (2007) and 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008), we use four proxies namely CEO tenure, age, gender and 
state share ownership. CEO tenure is measured by the number of years that a CEO has spent in 
this role. CEO gender is measured by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a CEO is 
female and 0 otherwise. The Chinese government still owns considerable controlling sharehold- 
ings in listed companies (Sun and Tong 2003). We argue that state ownership may influence board 
structure and the relationship between executive directors and INEDs. CEO tenure reflects board 
entrenchment as longer tenured CEOs may have more influence on the appointment of INEDs. 
We also argue that CEOs’ characteristics, for example, age and gender can be used as proxies 
for their influence. Younger directors and female directors may have different perspectives and 
hence may have an influence on the appointment of INEDs. 
To measure the constraints on CEOs’ influence in the Chinese context, we use three proxies 
namely CEO’s political connections, the proportion of academics on the board of directors and 
the proportion of shares owned by supervisory board members. Foreign directors and VCs may 
also influence CEO’s ability to appoint INEDs (Boone et al. 2007). Therefore, as a robustness 
check we use the proportion of foreign directors on the board of directors and the VC-backed 
IPOs dummy as alternative proxies for CEOs’ influence. 
Furthermore, we use other control variables that may drive our results, for example, IPO pro- 
ceeds and the number of IPO shares as alternative proxies for IPO size following the study     
of Butler, Keefe, and Kieschnick (2014). We use different measures of financial performance 
(accounting and market-based measures), for example, return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q 
(market value of equity book value of debt and the book value of preferred stocks/book value 
of total assets). Finally, we create a set of industry and year dummies to control for the potential 
inter-industry and time-specific effects. Table 1 presents a description of the variables used in the 
empirical analysis. 
 
 
5. Empirical modelling 
Endogeneity between both board size and independence and financial performance may lead  
to spurious correlations due to the omitted unobservable company characteristics, for example, 
corporate culture, norms which are assumed to be time invariant during the period of study 
(Farag and Mallin 2016). To investigate the main determinants of Chinese IPOs’ two-tier board 
structure and the influence of board structure on financial performance, we carefully address 
the endogeneity concerns using four strategies; firstly, we control for industry fixed effects in 
all models to control for unobservable characteristics and underlying economic indicators and 
environment (e.g. market conditions, competition and technology) which may drive the results 
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(Boone et al. 2007; Cheng 2008; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2008; Adams and Ferreira 2009; 
Farag and Mallin 2016). 
Secondly, following Farag and Mallin (2016) we use the system GMM estimator6 of Blundell 
and Bond (1998) as a robustness check to address the dynamic nature of board structure and the 
potential reverse causality in the estimation. The use of historical values of suspect endogenous 
variables as internal instruments is widely used in the literature to control for simultaneity and 
other sources of endogeneity and that a higher order of lag length results in more exogenous 
instruments;7 see, for example, Roodman (2009), Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) and Farag 
and Mallin (2016). Therefore, following Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012), we use four lags  
of suspect endogenous variables as instruments in the equation in first-differences, and three 
lags of their difference as instruments in the equation in levels. We also use both the Hansen 
over-identification test and the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for first- and second-order auto- 
correlation to measure the validity of our instruments and the validity of moments conditions 
used, respectively. Moreover, we estimate robust standard errors clustered at the company level 
to produce robust, reliable and unbiased coefficient estimates. 
Thirdly, we use the PSM technique to control for observable differences in company and 
industry characteristics using the nearest neighbour technique with replacement and common 
support and within a maximum distance of 1% following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and 
Abadie and Imbens (2006). Our treatment and control groups are IPOs and non-IPOs, respec- 
tively. We match our sample of IPOs with that of non-IPOs with similar characteristics namely 
company size, profitability, leverage, industry concentration (HHI) and state ownership over the 
same period of time. 
Finally, we use the 2005 stock split reform as an exogenous shock within our identification 
strategy to check whether or not our results are driven by this event. In April 2005, the Chinese 
government and the regulator (the CSRC) introduced the share reform plan by which it allowed 
non-tradable shares owned mainly by the government to be tradable. Therefore, we apply the 
difference-in-differences specification using the propensity score matched sample. 
 
 
6. Empirical results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the pooled sample during the period 1999–2009. We 
find that the average size for the board of directors and the supervisory board is 9.5 and 4.19 
directors/supervisors, respectively. Moreover, the average proportion of INEDs on the board of 
directors is 32.7%. 
The average ROA and Tobin’s Q are 6.8% and 1.78, respectively, and the average company 
size, measured by log total assets is 21.48 (2130 million RMB) whilst the average annualised 
standard deviation of daily stock returns is 70.3%. Table 2 also presents the CEOs’ characteristics 
for our sample. The average CEO age and tenure is 46.67 and 3.33 years, respectively, whilst the 
average proportions of female and politically connected CEOs are 4.6% and 0.6%, respectively. 
Moreover, the proportions of academics and foreign directors on the board of directors are 15.3% 
and 0.9%, respectively, over the same period of time. Furthermore, the average directors’ and 
supervisors’ share ownership are 5.9% and 0.2%, respectively. However, the average state own- 
ership is 21.6%; whereas 0.6% of our sample companies are VC-backed. The average company 
age is 9.63 years and finally, the average ratios of debt to total assets and free cash flow to total 
assets are 45.2% and 8.1%, respectively, whilst 19.1% of our sample is fast growth companies. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the pooled sample. 
 
 Mean Median SD Min Max 
B.size 9.501 9.000 2.005 5.000 19.000 
SB.size 4.193 3.000 1.555 3.000 15.000 
INED 0.327 0.333 0.102 0.000 0.800 
ROA 0.068 0.059 0.089 − 1.674 1.789 
Tobin’s Q 1.786 1.368 1.188 0.464 15.929 
LogTA 21.480 21.236 1.239 17.272 28.405 
Sdsrtn 0.703 0.463 1.208 0.002 4.465 
CEOage 46.672 46.000 6.701 24.000 77.000 
CEO Tenure 3.332 3.000 1.692 1.000 20.000 
FemCEO 0.046 0.000 0.187 0.000 1.000 
CEOPolcon 0.006 0.000 0.077 0.000 1.000 
PolconBoD 0.232 0.222 0.187 0.000 1.000 
Academics 0.153 0.111 0.1659 0.000 0.950 
Foreign 0.009 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.778 
DirOwn 0.059 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.748 
SupOwn 0.002 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.271 
StateOwn 0.216 0.015 0.266 0.000 0.863 
VC 0.006 0.000 0.076 0.000 1.000 
Coage 9.632 9.000 4.189 1.000 25.000 
D/TA 0.452 0.451 0.198 0.003 1.179 
FCF 0.081 0.079 0.093 − 0.315 0.867 
MTB 1.710 1.368 1.211 0.420 31.031 
HHI 0.075 0.410 0.095 0.014 0.851 
Growth 0.191 0.000 0.393 0.000 1.000 
Notes: Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the pooled sample during 
the period 1999–2009. Please see variables definition in Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 3 presents a summary of board structure and governance characteristics for the Chinese 
IPOs over time since the IPO year. 
We find that the average board size decreases from 9.4 directors in the IPO year to around 9 
directors on year 12 post-IPO, whereas the supervisory board size increases from 4 to 4.3 supervi- 
sors during the same period. Moreover, we notice an increase in the proportion of INEDs during 
the same period from 24.4% in the IPO year to 36.9% on year 12 post-IPO. This reflects the 
impact of the published corporate governance guidelines with respect to board independence.8 
We also notice that, consistent with the Chinese economic reform, the proportion of state 
share ownership decreases from 29.3% in the IPO year to 5.7% on year 12 post-IPO. Moreover, 
directors’ ownership significantly decreases from 10.5% to 0.1% during the same period. Table 3 
also reports that there is a slight increase in the average proportion of female CEOs from 4.1% in 
the IPO year to 5.1% in year 12 post-IPO. Similarly, the average CEO tenure and age increased 
from 3.1 and 45.8 years in IPO year to 4.7 and 49.8 in year 12 post-IPO. Finally,  we notice      
a constant proportion of politically connected directors of 23% approximately over the same 
period of time whilst there is a remarkable increase in the average proportion of academics on 
the board of directors from 12.3% in the IPO year to 18.6% in year 12 post-IPO. 
In Table 4, we investigate whether there is a significant difference between board size and 
independence for both the supervisory board and the board of directors. We split the sample 
based on median company size (big and small companies). We also split the sample based on 
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Table 3. Board structure and governance characteristics for IPOs. 
Year from IPO 
 IPO year Year 3 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year 12 
B.size 9.489 9.607 9.620 9.466 9.339 9.077 
SB.size 4.037 4.141 4.257 4.273 4.339 4.321 
INED 0.244 0.341 0.349 0.356 0.361 0.369 
StateOwn 0.293 0.220 0.221 0.193 0.101 0.057 
DirOwn 0.105 0.088 0.045 0.020 0.004 0.001 
FemCEO 0.041 0.040 0.037 0.025 0.041 0.051 
CEO Tenure 3.147 3.306 3.520 3.164 3.336 4.750 
CEOage 45.810 46.481 46.819 46.678 47.802 49.805 
PolconBoD 0.228 0.230 0.238 0.233 0.226 0.229 
Academics 12.364 17.021 16.408 15.306 16.760 18.673 
Obs 892 783 596 410 277 212 
Notes: Table 3 presents a summary of board structure and governance characteristics for the Chinese IPOs over time 
since the IPO year. Please see variables definition in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 4. Univariate analysis of board size and independence for the supervisory board and the board of 
directors. 
 
 Big size Small size High growth Low growth SSE SZSE 
B.size 12.877 9.058 9.227 9.566 9.678 9.247 
t-statistics 11.020*** − 5.965*** 9.536*** 
SB.size 5.115 3.832 3.933 4.254 4.353 3.961 
t-statistics 10.070*** − 7.297*** 11.169*** 
INED 0.376 0.343 0.326  0.335 0.325 0.331 
t-statistics  3.231***  − 7.598***  − 12.331*** 
Notes: The table presents the results of the univariate analysis of board size and independence for both the supervisory 
board and the board of directors. The univariate analysis is designed to compare the median of company size (big     
and small companies), growth potential (high and low growth companies) and stock exchange (Shanghai, (SSE) and 
Shenzhen, (SZSE)). Please see variables definition in Table 1. 
***Significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
growth potential (high and low growth companies) and finally based on the stock exchange 
where the IPOs were floated (Shanghai or Shenzhen). 
Table 4 shows that big companies and those floated on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 
are characterised by a larger board of director size and a larger supervisory board size compared 
with small companies and those floated on the SZSE. By contrast, high growth companies are 
characterised by smaller board size and less independence. These results are consistent with the 
monitoring hypothesis. Moreover, Table 4 shows that big companies and those floated in SZSE 
have more independent boards compared with small companies and those floated in SSE. 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for the main variables used in the empirical analysis. 
The signs on the coefficients are in line with the literature on board structure. We find no evidence 
of multicollinearity problem. We also calculate the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for all fixed 
effects regressions and find that the mean VIF values range from 1.45 to 1.91 suggesting that our 
models are not subject to severe multicollinearity problem. 
 − 
− 
− 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Correlation matrix. 
B.size INED SB. size Acdm LogTA Coage D/TA FCF HHI Log MTB Sdsrtn Growth Dir own 
B.size 1.000 
INED 0.132 1.000 
SB.size 0.288 0.074 1.000 
Academics 0.032 0.307 0.033 1.000 
LogTA 0.221 0.184 0.189 0.147 1.000 
Coage 0.054 0.352 0.025 0.108 0.221 1.000 
D/TA 0.073 0.139 0.089 0.041 0.385 0.231 1.000 
FCF 0.080 0.016 0.044 0.026 0.168    − 0.070  − 0.232 1.000 
HHI 0.100 0.004 0.161 0.066 0.196    − 0.104  − 0.017 0.121 1.000 
LogMTB − 0.131 0.004 − 0.087 0.063   − 0.325 0.092   − 0.270 0.088   − 0.016 1.000 
Sdsrtn 0.010   − 0.191 − 0.024 − 0.047    − 0.138    − 0.174 − 0.097 0.025 0.010 0.071 1.000 
Growth − 0.067 0.044 − 0.081 0.048    − 0.178    − 0.046  − 0.227 0.004 0.070 0.198 0.020 1.000 
DirOwn − 0.160 0.143 − 0.198 0.078    − 0.181    − 0.107  − 0.209 0.049   − 0.019 0.110 0.067 0.143 1.000 
StateOwn 0.212   − 0.239 0.213 − 0.080 0.089   − 0.348 0.018 0.052 0.116 − 0.304 0.054 − 0.121 − 0.314 
SupOwn − 0.061 0.048 − 0.043 0.037    − 0.102    − 0.074  − 0.097 0.030   − 0.018 0.033 0.076 0.075 0.374 
ROA 0.035   − 0.017 0.006 0.035 0.086    − 0.050   − 0.256 0.419 0.091 0.185 0.041 0.040 0.088 
Tobin’s Q − 0.106 0.036 − 0.064 0.068   − 0.252 0.106   − 0.222 0.094   − 0.014 0.918 0.028 0.178 0.068 
FemCEO − 0.063 0.029 − 0.038 0.016   − 0.047 0.018    − 0.025    − 0.020 − 0.028 0.044 0.020 − 0.005 0.083 
CEO Tenure 0.010   − 0.015 − 0.0002 0.029 0.077 0.059   − 0.040 0.034 0.045 0.009 − 0.048 0.035 0.028 
VC − 0.017 0.005 − 0.018 0.039 0.000 0.014   − 0.031 0.0003 − 0.014 0.006 0.037 0.010 0.062 
CEOage 0.084 0.054 0.034 0.060 0.187 0.120 0.027 0.045 0.041 − 0.002 − 0.032 − 0.043 − 0.062 
CEOPolcon 0.014 0.012 0.033 0.013 0.028   − 0.032 0.017    − 0.002  − 0.003 − 0.025 0.005 − 0.016 − 0.018 
PolconBoD 0.112 0.050 0.068 0.121 0.232   − 0.013 0.040 0.074 0.129 − 0.082 − 0.035 − 0.067 − 0.079 
Foreign 0.040   − 0.059 − 0.035 − 0.010 0.018 0.021   − 0.036 0.047   − 0.040 0.003 0.023 0.011 0.019 
(Continued) 
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Table 5. Continued. 
StateOwn SupOwn ROA Tobin’s Q Fem CEO CEO Tenure VC CEO age CEO Polcon Polcon BoD Foreign 
StateOwn 1.000 
SupOwn − 0.130 1.000 
 
− 0.051 1.000 
CEO Tenure − 0.074 − 0.007 0.038 0.003 0.008 1.000 
VC − 0.039 0.004 0.006 − 0.001 0.012 0.037 1.000 
CEO age 0.021 − 0.003 0.049 − 0.006 − 0.002 0.102 0.006 1.000 
CEOPolcon 0.055 0.072 − 0.010 − 0.022 − 0.006 0.009 0.016 0.049 1.000 
PolconBoD 0.098 − 0.055 0.050 − 0.064 0.010 0.010 − 0.007 0.086 0.037 1.000 
Foreign − 0.077 − 0.001 0.041 − 0.003 0.035 − 0.007 0.022 0.068 − 0.017 − 0.059 1.000 
Notes: The table presents the correlation matrix for the variables included in the empirical analysis. Please see variables definition in Table 1. Bold figures indicate significance 
at the 5% level or below. 
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ROA 0.003 0.039 1.000  
Tobin’s Q 
FemCEO 
− 0.250 0.012 
0.022 
0.175 
0.015 
1.000 
0.040 
 
16 H. Farag and C. Mallin 
 
6.2 The scope of operations hypothesis 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of the scope of operations hypothesis for the board of 
directors’ size (dependent variable) using both fixed effects and system GMM models as in 
Models 1–5, respectively. We include the lagged proportion of INEDs as an instrumental variable 
to control for endogeneity in Models 1–4 following Boone et al. (2007). 
In Models 1–3, we control for the alternative proxies for the scope of operations hypothesis 
individually whilst in Model 4 the three measures are included. The results presented in Models 
1–3 show that there is a positive and significant (p < 1% and p < 5%) relationship between 
the alternative proxies for the scope of operations hypothesis (log total assets, company age and 
the leverage ratio) and board of directors’ size. This suggests that the greater the company size, 
company age and leverage ratio (higher degree of complex operations), the more the directors 
there are on the board of directors. In Model 4, we find that all the proxies for the scope of 
 
Table 6. Tests for the scope of operations hypothesis for the board of directors size using fixed effects and 
system GMM estimator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.281) (0.279) (0.277) (0.283) 
 
(1.704) 
 
 
(0.930) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The table presents the results of both fixed effects and system GMM regressions for the scope of operations 
hypothesis using board of directors size as a dependent variable. Please see variables definition in Table 1. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the company level are reported in the parentheses. 
*Significance at the 10% level. 
**Significance at the 5% level. 
***Significance at the 1% level. 
BSize Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
L.B.size 
 
LogTA 
 
 
0.394*** 
  0.797*** 
(0.047) 
0.379*** 0.160*** 
 
Coage 
(0.023)  
0.016** 
 (0.024) (0.031) 
0.012* 0.036*** 
 
D/TA 
 (0.008)  
1.076*** 
(0.007) (0.013) 
0.260** − 0.474 
 
StateOwn 
 
1.065*** 
 
1.451*** 
(0.128) 
1.323*** 
(0.127) (0.446) 
1.091*** 0.227 
 (0.099) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.229) 
L.INED − 2.794*** 
INED 
− 2.308*** − 2.325*** − 2.847*** 
 
− 7.149*** 
L.ROA 0.321 1.282*** 1.737*** 0.470**  
 
ROA 
(0.201) (0.220) (0.255) (0.210) 
− 1.535* 
Cons 1.368*** 9.180*** 8.823*** 1.470*** 0.757 
 
Year dummy 
(0.490) 
Yes 
(0.165) 
Yes 
(0.165) 
Yes 
(0.499) 
Yes 
(0.646) 
Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.116 0.068 0.077 0.116  
F-Stat (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 7021 7025 7022 7019 7037 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) p value     0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) p value     0.685 
Hansen test p value     0.147 
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operations hypothesis are statistically significant. Moreover, in Model 5, the GMM estimation 
results also show a significant relationship between both company size and company age and 
the board of directors’ size. Therefore, our results are consistent with the scope of operations 
hypothesis with respect to the board of directors. 
Table 7  presents  the  results  of  both  fixed  effects  and  system  GMM  regressions  for  
the scope of operations hypothesis with respect to the supervisory board size (dependent 
variable). 
 
Table 7. Tests for the scope of operations hypothesis for the supervisory board size using fixed effects and 
system GMM estimator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.103) (0.124) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.181) 
 
(0.201) 
 
(0.179) 
 
(0.280) 
 
(0.418) (0.426) (0.274) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The table presents the results of both fixed effects and system GMM regressions for the scope of operations 
hypothesis using supervisory board size as a dependent variable. Please see variables definition in Table 1. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the company level are reported in the parentheses. 
*Significance at the 10% level. 
**Significance at the 5% level. 
***Significance at the 1% level. 
SB.size Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
L.SB.size     0.645*** 
     (0.034) 
L2.SB.size     0.113*** 
     (0.022) 
LogTA 0.164***   0.165*** 0.059*** 
 (0.020)   (0.021) (0.015) 
Coage  0.021***  0.021*** 0.006** 
  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.003) 
D/TA   
0.294*** 
(0.100) 
− 0.045 − 0.278** 
StateOwn 0.941*** 1.116*** 1.036*** 1.001*** 0.020 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.071) 
L.B.size 0.175*** 0.194*** 0.192*** 0.174***  
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  
B.size     0.046*** 
     (0.017) 
L.INED − 0.601*** 
(0.180) 
− 0.442** 
(0.179) 
− 0.374** 
(0.178) 
− 0.688***  
INED     − 0.371* 
L.ROA 0.354** 
(0.177) 
0.026 
(0.177) 
0.138 
(0.192) 
− 0.393**  
ROA     − 0.071 
Cons − 1.374*** 1.597*** 
(0.150) 
1.642*** 
(0.151) 
− 1.526*** − 0.547** 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.130 0.119 0.118 0.131  
F-stat (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 7020 7024 7021 7018 6156 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) p value     0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) p value     0.954 
Hansen test p value     0.360 
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Again, the results are consistent with the scope of operations hypothesis as the coefficients on 
the three proxies of the scope of operations hypothesis are positive and significant at the 1% level 
as in Models 1–3. Putting all proxies together in Model 4, we find that the coefficient on LogTA 
is positive and highly significant (p < 1%); however, the coefficient on D/TA is insignificant. 
The results presented in Model 5 using the system GMM also support the scope of operations 
hypothesis for the supervisory board. Interestingly, we find  a positive and highly significant   
(p < 1%) relationship between board of directors’ size and the supervisory board size. This 
suggests that the bigger the board of directors size, the bigger the supervisory board size and that 
the supervisory board size might be determined by the board of directors’ structure. However, 
and importantly, we find a negative and significant relationship (p < 1% and p < 5% in Models 
1–4) between the proportion of INEDs on the board of directors and supervisory board size.9 
This suggests that the higher the proportion of INEDs, the smaller the supervisory board size and 
this implies that the INEDs are perhaps a substituting mechanism for the supervisors’ monitoring 
role. We argue that there might be a conflict in monitoring roles between the supervisory board 
and the INEDs. 
Table 8 presents the estimation results of the scope of operations hypothesis using the 
proportion of INEDs as a dependent variable. 
We find consistent results with those presented in Table 6 as the coefficients on the three prox- 
ies for the scope of operations hypothesis are positive, statistically (p < 1%) and economically 
significant. This suggests that more complex companies may have more independent boards 
and that the higher the leverage and the older the company the greater the board indepen- 
dence. In Model 4, when we include all the three proxies, we also find a positive relationship 
with the proportion of INEDs; however, this relationship is highly significant with respect to 
company size and age. The results of the system GMM estimator (Model 5) are also con- 
sistent with the scope of operations hypothesis; however, we find that only company size is 
positively and significantly correlated with board independence. We agree with Boone et al. 
(2007) and Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006) that including alternative proxies in the same 
regression model may lead to an attenuation bias and hence insignificant individual coeffi- 
cients. In sum, the results presented in Models 1–5 are consistent with the scope of operations 
hypothesis. 
In Tables 6 and 7, we notice the positive and significant relationship between the proportion of 
state share ownership and both board of directors and the supervisory board size. Interestingly, 
in Table 8, we find a negative and highly significant relationship between state share owner- 
ship and the proportion of INEDs. This suggests that the greater the state share ownership, the 
larger the two boards and the lower the proportion of INEDs. This may suggest that state-owned 
companies may prefer to appoint supervisors on the supervisory board to carry out the moni- 
toring role rather than appointing INEDs on the board of directors. This argument is consistent 
with Dahya et al. (2003) as they argue that it is unlikely that supervisory boards will have an 
effective monitoring role as in reality they act as the voice of the government and the ruling 
party. 
Overall, the results presented in Tables 6–8 support the scope of operations hypothesis for 
Chinese IPOs suggesting that complex and more mature companies have larger and more inde- 
pendent boards. Therefore, we cannot reject our first hypothesis. Finally, the models presented in 
Tables 6–8 are well specified as the F statistics are highly significant (p < 1%) for all fixed 
effects models; in addition, the Hansen test does not reject the over-identifying restrictions 
assumption and the results of the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for the second-order serial 
correlation are insignificant for the system GMM. 
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Table 8. Tests for the scope of operations hypothesis for the board of directors independence using fixed 
effects and system GMM estimator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The table presents the results of both fixed effects and system GMM regressions for the scope of operations 
hypothesis using the proportion of INEDs as a dependent variable. Please see variables definition in Table 1. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the company level are reported in the parentheses. 
*Significance at the 10% level. 
**Significance at the 5% level. 
***Significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
6.3 Monitoring hypothesis 
Table 9 presents the estimation results of the monitoring hypothesis using board of directors’ size 
as a dependent variable. 
The monitoring hypothesis predicts that there is a trade-off between directors’ private ben- 
efits and the cost of monitoring. In Models 1 and 2, we present the results of the influence of 
directors’ private benefits proxied by companies’ free cash flow ratio and industry concentration. 
As expected, we find a positive and highly significant (p < 1%) relationship between the two 
proxies and board size. This suggests that the greater the directors’ private benefits the larger the 
board size. Our results are consistent with Jensen (1986) and Boone et al. (2007) as they argue 
that directors may use cash flow to achieve private benefits rather than maximising shareholders’ 
wealth. Moreover, directors in highly concentrated industries have the power to consume private 
benefits as they are less subject to market discipline. 
INED Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
L.INED 
 
LogTA 
 
 
0.009*** 
   
 
0.009*** 
0.599*** 
(0.044) 
0.003*** 
 (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Coage  0.003***  0.003*** 0.0002 
  (0.001)  (0.0003) (0.0005) 
D/TA   0.015*** 0.004 0.007 
 
StateOwn 
 
− 0.053*** 
(0.004) 
 
− 0.038*** 
(0.004) 
(0.005) 
− 0.048*** 
(0.004) 
(0.005) 
− 0.043*** 
(0.004) 
(0.011) 
− 0.004** 
L.B.size − 0.005*** − 0.004*** − 0.004*** − 0.004***  
B.size 
    
− 0.004*** 
L.ROA − 0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
− 0.018**  
ROA     0.001 
 
Cons 
 
0.140*** 
 
0.292*** 
 
0.311*** 
 
0.119*** 
(0.021) 
0.123*** 
 
Year dummy 
(0.020) 
Yes 
(0.010) 
Yes 
(0.009) 
Yes 
(0.020) 
Yes 
(0.019) 
Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.156 0.153 0.143 0.166  
F-stat (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 7026 7030 7027 7024 6972 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) p value     0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) p value     0.137 
Hansen test p value     0.520 
 
 − 
− 
− − − − − 
− − − − − − − − 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Tests for the monitoring hypothesis for board of directors size and independence using fixed effects and system GMM estimator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.053) (0.058) (0.004) 
 
(0.001) 
DirOwn 1.524*** 1.447*** 0.121 1.149*** 0.023* 
(0.173) (0.169) (0.133) (0.165) (0.013) 
LogTA 0.374*** 
(0.026) 
Coage 0.007 
(0.008) 
D/TA 0.154 
(0.138) 
StateOwn  1.397***  1.406***  1.278***  1.346***  1.413***  1.141***  0.941***  0.388***  0.870*** 0.008*** 
(0.100) (0.108) (0.102) (0.100) (0.100) (0.106) (0.118) (0.058) (0.116) (0.003) 
L.INED 2.287*** 6.898*** 2.219*** 2.198*** 2.258*** 1.838*** 6.520*** 7.626***  0.462*** 
(0.280) (0.453) (0.278) (0.279) (0.277) (0.284) (0.455) (0.459) (0.022) 
INED 5.019*** 
(0.407) 
(Continued). 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
L.B.size        0.802***   
        (0.010)   
FCF 1.142***      1.010*** 1.604*** 0.240 0.023** 
 (0.276)      (0.320) (0.219) (0.238) (0.009) 
HHI  1.486***     1.245*** 0.339** 0.512* 0.005 
  (0.328)     (0.316) (0.142) (0.310) (0.008) 
LogMTB   − 0.115*** 
(0.018) 
   − 0.102*** 
(0.019) 
− 0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.008 (0.020) − 0.002** 
           
Growth − 0.315***  − 0.230*** − 0.283*** − 0.055 − 0.016*** 
Sdsrtn  0.003 (0.030) 0.014 (0.024) 0.067*** 
(0.024) 
0.051*** 
(0.013) 
− 0.0004 
           
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.205) (0.005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
test for AR(1) 
p value 
Arellano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
p value 
Hansen test p 
value 
 
 
0.182 0.820 
 
0.127 0.231 
 
 
Notes: The table presents the fixed effects and system GMM estimation results for the monitoring hypothesis (the trade-off between directors’ private benefits and the cost of 
monitoring) using board of directors’ size as a dependent variable. In Model 10, we use the proportion of INEDs as a dependent variable. Please see variables definition in Table 
1. Robust standard errors clustered at the company level are reported in the parentheses. 
*Significance at the 10% level. 
**Significance at the 5% level. 
***Significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 9. Continued.          
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
L.ROA 0.711*** 1.099*** 1.391*** 1.309*** 1.288*** 1.417*** 0.877***  0.232 
 (0.239) (0.239) (0.222) (0.220) (0.218) (0.224) (0.246)  (0.249) 
ROA 
 
Cons 
 
9.270*** 
 
11.102*** 
 
9.492*** 
 
9.305*** 
 
9.288*** 
 
9.395*** 
 
11.366*** 
− 1.016*** 
3.660*** 
 
3.731*** 
− 0.003 
0.190*** 
 (0.156) (0.215) (0.156) (0.153) (0.153) (0.155) (0.220) (0.209) (0.553) (0.011) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.071 0.106 0.072 0.071 0.069 0.076 0.124  0.165  
F-stat (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 6993 6111 7021 7025 7005 7024 6067 6072 6066 5405 
Arellano-Bond        0.000  0.000 
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On the other hand, we find consistent results with respect to the cost of monitoring proxied by 
the log of market-to-book ratio, the fast growth dummy and the proportion of directors’ owner- 
ship as we find – as expected – a negative and highly significant (p < 1%) relationship between 
the three proxies and board size as presented in Models 3, 4 and 6. However, the fourth proxy 
for the cost of monitoring, namely the annualised standard deviation of daily stock returns is 
insignificant as in Model 5. These results are consistent with Boone et al. (2007) as they suggest 
that in noisy environments, for example, fast growth, the cost of monitoring tends to be higher. 
Moreover, directors’ ownership mitigates agency conflicts that arise from high monitoring costs 
in fast growth industries. In Models 7 and 8, we include all proxies for the monitoring hypothesis 
in the fixed effects and system GMM respectively. The results presented in Models 7 and 8 are 
consistent with the monitoring hypothesis with reasonably high statistical and economic signifi- 
cance. In Model 9, we include all proxies for the scope of operations and monitoring hypotheses 
in one regression. Again, we find consistent results (sign) with the two hypotheses; however  
the results are only significant at the 10% level with respect to the industry concentration vari- 
able measured by the Herfindahl index. This is mainly due to the attenuation bias resulting from 
including all the proxies in one regression model. 
In Model 10, we estimate the monitoring hypothesis using the proportion of INEDs.10 
For brevity,  we present the GMM estimation results which are found to be consistent with    
the monitoring hypothesis. Therefore, the results presented in Table 9 support our second and 
third hypotheses. Interestingly, we find a positive and highly significant (p < 1%) relationship 
between the proportion of state share ownership and board size (Models 1–9); however, we find 
a negative and highly significant relationship with board independence (Model 10). This result is 
consistent with those presented in Tables 6–8 and suggests the potential preference of the state to 
appoint supervisors rather than INEDs. Finally, the results of the fixed effects and system GMM 
regressions are well specified as F statistics are highly significant and the Hansen test does not 
reject the over-identifying restrictions. 
 
6.4 Negotiation hypothesis 
The negotiation hypothesis posits that board composition is a trade-off between CEOs’ power 
and the constraint on this power. Table 10 presents the results of the negotiation hypothesis for 
the Chinese IPOs. 
 
Table 10. Tests for negotiation hypothesis for board independence using fixed effects and system GMM 
estimator. 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
CEO Tenure − 0.002**  − 0.002** − 0.003*** − 0.002** − 0.0002 
 
 
 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
 
(Continued). 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) 
CEOage 0.0005** 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0002** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
FemCEO 0.012** 0.012** 0.009 0.012** 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.020) (0.005) (0.004) 
CEOPolcon 
 
StateOwn 
 
− 0.047*** 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
− 0.041*** 
0.027*** 
(0.009) 
− 0.041*** 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
− 0.009* 
0.025*** 
(0.009) 
− 0.036*** 
− 0.0001 
(0.008) 
− 0.011*** 
(0.003) 
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(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
 
 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
p value 
Arellano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
p value 
Hansen test p 
value 
 
0.130 
 
0.478 
 
 
Notes: The table presents the results of the negotiation hypothesis (the influence of CEOs’ power and the constraints on 
CEOs’ power) for board of directors’ independence using fixed effects and system GMM estimator. Please see variables 
definition in Table 1. Robust standard errors clustered at the company level are reported in the parentheses. 
*Significance at the 10% level. 
**Significance at the 5% level. 
***Significance at the 1% level. 
 
Model 1 presents the results of the influence of CEOs’ power on the proportion of INEDs. 
We use four alternative measures of CEOs’ influence namely CEO tenure, age, gender and state 
ownership. As expected, the results presented in Model 1 show that there is a negative and 
Table 10. Continued.  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Academics  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0001 0.001*** 0.0003*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.00005) 
SupOwn  0.273*** 0.258*** 0.224* 0.298*** − 0.037 
  (0.051) (0.050) (0.135) (0.047) (0.039) 
L.B.size − 0.004*** − 0.003*** − 0.004*** − 0.003*** − 0.004*** − 0.006*** 
L.ROA 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
− 0.007 
(0.008) 
− 0.007 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.033) 
− 0.021** 
(0.009) 
− 0.033*** 
L.INED    0.396***   
    (0.030)   
LogTA     0.007*** 0.009*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Coage     0.003*** 
(0.001) 
− 0.001 
D/TA     − 0.002 
(0.005) 
− 0.010** 
FCF      − 0.018** 
HHI 
     
− 0.015** 
      (0.007) 
LogMTB      0.009*** 
      (0.002) 
Growth      0.004** 
      (0.002) 
Sdsrtn      0.001 
      (0.001) 
Cons 0.305*** 0.301*** 0.297*** 0.253*** 0.153*** 0.222*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.141 0.196 0.195  0.210 0.109 
F-stat (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 6886 7030 6886 6822 6881 5957 
Arellano-Bond    0.000   
test for AR(1)       
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significant relationship (p < 5% and p < 1%, respectively) between both CEO tenure and state 
share ownership and board independence. The negative influence of CEO tenure is consistent 
with Boone et al. (2007). This suggests that the longer the CEO tenure, the lower the proportion 
of INEDs and hence longer tenured CEOs have more influence on appointing INEDs. The above 
results support our fourth hypothesis. 
However, we find a positive and significant (p < 5%) relationship between both CEO age 
and gender and board independence. This suggests that the presence of young and female CEOs 
may correlate with a greater proportion of INEDs. Female directors are well documented in the 
literature as having a better monitoring role compared with their male counterparts as they have 
different opinions and perspectives (Adams and Ferreira 2009). In China, Cumming, Leung, and 
Rui (2015) find evidence that female directors are more effective in reducing the frequency and 
severity of fraud in particular in male-dominated industries. 
Model 2 presents the results of the constraints on CEOs’ influence proxied by CEO political 
connections, the proportion of academics on the board of directors and shares owned by super- 
visory board members. As expected by the negotiation hypothesis, we find a positive and highly 
significant (p < 1%) relationship between the three proxies and the proportion of INEDs. This 
suggests that CEOs’ political connections and the presence of academics on the board of direc- 
tors, in addition to the proportion of shares owned by the supervisory board members, may result 
in a greater proportion of INEDs. However, the economic significance of the proportion of shares 
owned by the supervisory board is the highest compared with the other two proxies. Again, the 
above results support our fifth hypothesis. Model 3 presents the results of combining both Mod- 
els 1 and 2, that is, CEOs’ influence and the constraints on their influence. We find consistent 
results with those presented in Models 1 and 2. 
Model 4 presents the results of the negotiation hypothesis using system GMM to address the 
potential endogeneity concerns. Overall, we find consistent results with respect to CEO tenure, 
political connections, state share ownership and the proportion of shares owned by supervisors; 
however, the results are only significant at the 10% level for both state share ownership and  
the proportion of shares owned by supervisors. Moreover, we find that CEO gender and the 
proportion of academics have the same sign, though they are insignificant. Therefore, our results 
provide strong support for the negotiation hypothesis. In Models 5 and 6, we present the results of 
the negotiation hypothesis in addition to the scope of operations and the monitoring hypotheses, 
respectively. We find consistent results with the scope of operations hypothesis, however, we 
find opposite signs with respect to the monitoring hypothesis; Boone et al. (2007) argue that this 
is due to attenuation bias resulting from including multiple proxies in the same model. Finally, 
the results of fixed effects and system GMM regressions are well specified as F statistics for the 
fixed effects models are highly significant and the Hansen test does not reject the over-identifying 
restrictions. 
 
6.5 The influence of board structure on financial performance 
Table 11 presents the fixed effects and GMM estimation results of the influence of board structure 
on financial performance. 
The results presented in Models 1 and 3, in which we use ROA as a dependent variable, show 
that there is a positive though insignificant relationship between board structure and financial per- 
formance. However, when using the Q ratio in Models 2 and 4, we find a positive and significant 
relationship between the proportion of INEDs and financial performance. This result is consis- 
tent with Prevost, Rao, and Hossain (2002) and Cho and Rui (2009) and suggests that the higher 
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Table 11. The influence of board structure on financial performance using fixed effects and system GMM 
estimator. 
Panel A Panel B 
  
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 
ROA Tobin’s Q  ROA Tobin’s Q 
L.ROA 0.508*** 
(0.170) 
L.T obin’s Q 0.696** 
(0.355) 
B.size 0.0005 0.001 0.009 0.226 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.009) (0.268) 
SB.size 0.0005 0.015* 0.005 0.587 
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.465) 
INED 0.023 1.346*** 0.536 4.743** 
(0.019) (0.304) (0.352) (2.184) 
D/TA 0.017 0.058 0.015 2.151** 
(0.012) (0.107) (0.040) (0.940) 
LogTA  0.010***  0.231***  0.001  0.857*** 
(0.001) (0.015) (0.007) (0.215) 
Sdsrtn  0.001**  0.046**  0.018  1.198** 
(0.0004) (0.020) (0.021) (0.564) 
StateOwn  0.015***  0.950***  0.012  2.425*** 
(0.003) (0.044) (0.022) (0.874) 
VC 0.004 0.178* 0.092 22.934** 
(0.008) (0.107) (0.123) (8.938) 
Foreign 0.057*** 0.042 0.107 7.347 
(0.020) (0.291) (0.143) (8.404) 
PolconBoD 0.014*** 0.009 0.033 10.158*** 
(0.004) (0.069) (0.079) (3.748) 
Cons − 0.110*** 5.709*** 0.255** 1.809 
 
Year dummy 
Industry dummy 
(0.026) 
Yes 
Yes 
(0.285) 
Yes 
Yes 
(0.112) 
Yes 
Yes 
(5.463) 
Yes 
Yes 
R2 0.056 0.149   
F-stat (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 6363 6363 5890 5871 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) p value   0.001 0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) p value   0.294 0.134 
Hansen test p value   0.448 0.208 
Notes: The table presents the fixed effects and GMM estimation results of the influence of board structure on financial 
performance. Please see variables definition in Table 1. Robust standard errors clustered at the company level are reported 
in the parentheses. 
*Significance at the 10% level. 
**Significance at the 5% level. 
***Significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
the proportion of INEDs, the better the financial performance. In Model 2, we also find a positive 
and marginally significant relationship between the supervisory board size and financial perfor- 
mance. Again, we argue that there might be a conflict in the monitoring roles between INEDs 
and supervisors. The above results do not support our sixth hypothesis, but partially support the 
seventh hypothesis. 
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− 
Finally, our models are well specified as F statistics for the fixed effects models are highly 
significant and the tests regarding serial correlation for the system GMM estimator reject the 
absence of first order, but not the second-order serial correlation. Moreover, the Hansen test does 
not reject the over-identifying restrictions. 
 
6.6 Robustness tests 
6.6.1 Propensity score matching 
We further address endogeneity concerns by using the PSM technique to control for observable 
differences in company and industry characteristics. Using the nearest neighbour technique with 
replacement and common support and within a maximum distance of 1% following Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) and Abadie and Imbens (2006), we match our sample of IPOs with that of 
non-IPOs with similar characteristics namely size, profitability, leverage, industry concentration 
(HHI) and state ownership over the same period of time. Table 12 presents the univariate analysis 
for the difference in means test between IPO (treatment) and non-IPO (control) samples using the 
matching variables. The results presented in Table 12 show that there is no significant difference 
between treated and control samples with respect to the matching variables and that our matched 
sample is balanced over those variables. 
We present in Table  13 the estimation results of the scope of operations hypothesis using  
the PSM matched sample for the board of directors size and independence and the supervisory 
board size. 
We firstly apply the probit model (Model 1) to investigate the main determinants of IPOs fol- 
lowing the study of Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998). We use company size, profitability, 
leverage and growth opportunities, in addition to year and industry dummies to estimate the pro- 
bit model. Moreover, we control for the proportion of state ownership as a distinguishing feature 
of the Chinese market. We find that big company size, profitability and lower leverage are the 
main determinants for the Chinese companies to go public. We also find that there is a signif- 
icant difference in board structure and independence for IPOs compared with non-IPOs as the 
coefficient on the IPO dummy is significant in Models 2–4. The results presented in Models 2 
and 3 suggest that boards of directors tend to be larger; however supervisory boards tend to be 
smaller for IPOs. Moreover, in Model 4, we find that IPOs’ boards are marginally more indepen- 
dent compared with non-IPOs. We argue that IPOs tend to increase their board independence to 
comply with corporate governance best practice. Furthermore, the results presented in Table 13 
are consistent with the scope of operations hypothesis.11 
 
Table 12. Difference in means test between IPOs and non-IPOs for the PSM 
matching variables. 
D/TA 0.469 0.475 1.21 
State own 0.186 0.185 0.39 
HHI 0.075 0.073 1.41 
Notes: The table presents the univariate analysis of the difference in means test between 
IPOs and non-IPOs for the variables used in the PSM. Please see variables definition in 
Table 1. 
Matching variables Treated Control t-stats 
Log TA 
ROA 
21.54 
0.041 
21.562 
0.039 
− 0.94 
0.62 
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Table 13. Tests for the scope of operations hypothesis using propensity score matched sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.071) (0.003) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.279) (0.038) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The table presents the estimation outputs of the scope of operations hypothesis using the PSM matched sample 
for the board of directors’ size and independence and for the supervisory board size. Please see variables definition in 
Table 1. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
*Significance at the 10% level. 
**Significance at the 5% level. 
***Significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
6.6.2 Stock split reform exogenous shock 
We use the 2005 stock split reform as an exogenous shock within our identification strategy to 
further check whether or not our results are derived from the stock split and economic reform. 
Table 14 presents the results of our experiment using difference-in-differences specification for 
the scope of operations hypothesis using the propensity score matched sample. We present the 
results of the scope of operations hypothesis using three dependent variables namely board     
of directors’ size, supervisory board size and board independence as in Panels A, B and C, 
respectively. 
Our treatment and control groups are IPOs and non-IPOs, respectively. We control for post 
reform period using a dummy variable (Post Reform) which takes the value of 1 post stock split 
reform and 0 otherwise. Moreover, we control for the interaction term (IPO*Post Reform) as a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for IPOs post reform and 0 otherwise. In Panels A and 
 Probit model IPO Board of directors size Supervisory board size INEDs 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
IPO  0.133*** 
(0.031) 
− 0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.002* 
(0.0012) 
Log TA 0.018** 0.479*** 0.029*** 0.003*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.002) (0.0004) 
D/TA − 0.334*** 
(0.036) 
0.030 
(0.026) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.020*** 
(0.001) 
ROA 0.043** 
(0.020) 
   
L.ROA − 0.125* − 0.006** 0.0001 
(0.002) 
L.Bsize  0.034*** 
(0.001) 
− 0.006*** 
L.INED − 10.381*** − 0.211*** 
State own − 0.011 0.687*** 0.153*** − 0.003 
 (0.049) (0.075) (0.010) (0.002) 
HHI 0.072    
 (0.100)    
Constant − 0.671*** 
(0.175) 
5.067*** 
(0.383) 
0.810*** 
(0.045) 
0.345*** 
(0.011) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 15,728 13,435 13,175 13,287 
LR chi2 (p value) 0.000    
F-stat (p value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.018    
Adj. R2  0.250 0.213 0.144 
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Table 14. The influence of stock split reform on board structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.100) (0.002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
 
(0.034) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The table presents the results of the difference-in-differences specification of the scope of operation hypothesis 
for the board of directors, the supervisory board size and board independence using the propensity score matched sample 
as in Panels A, B and C, respectively. We use the 2005 stock split reform as an exogenous shock; we also use IPOs and 
non-IPOs dummies as treatment and control groups, respectively. Please see variables definition in Table 1. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
*Significance at the 10% level. 
**Significance at the 5% level. 
***Significance at the 1% level. 
 
B, we notice that the coefficients on the Post Reform dummy are negative and highly significant. 
This suggests that board of directors’ size and supervisory board size tend to be smaller post 
stock split reform. However, and consistent with the calls for more independent boards, the 
proportion of INEDs tends to be higher post reform as the coefficient on the Post Reform dummy 
is positive and highly significant in Panel C. We also find that the coefficients on the interaction 
term (IPO*Post Reform) are insignificant in all Models suggesting that the changes in board size 
and independence and supervisory board size pre and post stock split reform are not driving our 
findings on the scope of operations hypothesis.12 
Furthermore, as another robustness test, we calculate the annual changes in board structure 
around the IPO year and re-estimate all the regressions for the three hypotheses. Again, we find 
consistent results with the scope of operations, monitoring and negotiation hypotheses. Finally, 
we use different proxies for the constraints on CEOs’ influence, for example, the presence of VC 
 Panel A Panel B  Panel C 
Board of directors size Supervisory board size  INEDs 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
IPO 0.194*** 0.231** 
(0.032) (0.094) 
− 0.022*** − 0.032*** 
(0.004)  (0.012) 
 0.001 0.002 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Post reform − 0.742*** − 0.731*** − 0.062*** − 0.065***  0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.086) (0.090) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.002) (0.002) 
IPO*Post reform  − 0.043  0.011 (0.012)  
− 0.001 
LogTA 0.480*** 0.480*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
D/TA 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
State own 0.587*** 0.587*** 0.141*** 0.141*** − 0.005** − 0.005** 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) 
L.ROA − 0.001 
(0.001) 
− 0.001 
(0.001) 
− 0.0004 
(0.002) 
− 0.0004 
(0.002) 
− 0.005*** 
(0.0002) 
− 0.005*** 
        
L.Bsize   
0.033*** 
(0.001) 
0.033*** 
(0.001) 
− 0.007*** − 0.007*** 
L.INED − 8.928*** 
(0.258) 
− 8.928*** 
(0.258) 
− 0.007 
(0.034) 
− 0.006   
Constant 4.276*** 4.276*** 0.791*** 0.794*** 0.346*** 0.346*** 
 (0.409) (0.409) (0.045) (0.045) (0.010) (0.010) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435 
F-stat (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj R2 0.240 0.240 0.210 0.210 0.101 0.101 
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and the proportion of foreign directors on boards and obtain similar results with respect to the 
three hypotheses.13 
 
7. Summary, conclusion and discussion 
In this paper, we investigate the main board structure hypotheses namely the scope of opera- 
tions, monitoring and negotiation hypotheses for a sample of Chinese IPOs floated in the SSE 
and SZSE. Our results are consistent with the scope of operations hypothesis and suggest that  
a higher degree of a company’s complex operations results in greater board size and indepen- 
dence. We also find evidence of the scope of operations hypothesis with respect to the supervisory 
board size and that more complex companies may have larger supervisory boards. Moreover, we 
find that the larger the board size, the larger the supervisory board size and this implies that 
more supervisors might be required to oversee and monitor a larger board of directors. Inter- 
estingly, we find that the higher the proportion of INEDs, the smaller the supervisory board 
size and this implies that INEDs are perhaps a substituting mechanism for the supervisors’ 
monitoring role. 
The results show that there is a positive and significant relationship between the proportion 
of state share ownership and both board size and the supervisory board size.  However,  we  
find a negative and significant relationship between state share ownership and the proportion  
of INEDs. This suggests that the state – as a controlling shareholder – may influence and enforce 
the appointment of supervisors on the supervisory board to carry out the monitoring role rather 
than appointing INEDs on the board of directors. This argument is consistent with Dahya et al. 
(2003) as they argue that supervisors in reality act as the voice of the government and the ruling 
party. Therefore, we argue that there might be a conflict in the monitoring roles between the 
supervisory board and INEDs. 
We also find evidence of the monitoring hypothesis for Chinese IPOs. Our results are consis- 
tent with Jensen (1986) and Boone et al. (2007) and show that the greater the directors’ private 
benefits, the larger the board size. Moreover, directors in highly concentrated industries may have 
the power to consume private benefits as they are less subject to market discipline. In addition, 
we find that in noisy environments, for example, fast growth, the cost of monitoring tends to be 
higher. Therefore, Chinese IPOs’ board structure is determined as a trade-off between directors’ 
private benefits and the cost of monitoring. 
Furthermore, we find evidence of the negotiation hypothesis as we find that longer tenured 
CEOs would tend to influence the appointment of INEDs and that the longer the CEO tenure 
the less the proportion of INEDs on the board of directors. On the other hand, we find  that    
the greater the CEOs’ political connections and the greater the proportion of shares owned by 
the supervisory board members, the greater the proportion of INEDs on the board of directors. 
Therefore, board structure for Chinese IPOs is an outcome of CEOs’ influence and the constraints 
on this influence. 
According to the Chinese Company Law, supervisory board members should be elected by 
shareholders to oversee and monitor the board of directors – mainly executive directors – to 
mitigate any agency conflict. However, the supervisory board has no actual power to exercise 
this role (Clarke 2006). On the other hand, the board of directors is comprised – in addition to 
executive directors – of INEDs to monitor and advise directors and to protect the overall inter- 
ests of the company and minority shareholders in particular. The Chinese dual board mechanism 
was inspired by the German governance mechanism; however, there are fundamental differences 
between the two models (Wang 2008). The supervisory board in Germany has much more power 
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compared with the Chinese one including the appointment and removal of directors on the man- 
agement board. Moreover, the German management board reports to the supervisory board as 
there is a hierarchical relationship between the two boards. In such a mechanism, the oversight 
role is deemed to be a function of the supervisory board due to the relationship between the two 
boards. Such a hierarchical relationship does not exist in China. Therefore, it is hard for a super- 
visory board without much power to exercise effective supervision of the board of directors in 
China (Wang 2008). 
On the other hand, we argue that whilst the Chinese regulator (CSRC) issued guidelines on the 
introduction of independent directors (CSRC 2001b) to enhance the overall board effectiveness 
and monitoring role, more comprehensive reform is required. Lu (2005) argues that: 
 
In conclusion, in China so far, the introduction of independent directors does not guarantee the effec- 
tive operation of boards. Since the establishment of the board of supervisors system has not been able 
to fully play a supervisory role in companies, sufficient conditions do not exist for the independent 
directors to play their roles. In this situation, listed companies have been able to invite independent 
directors who are independent in name only. 
 
Furthermore, Clarke (2006) argues that the supervisory board in China plays no significant 
role in corporate governance and the vast majority of companies tend to maintain the supervisory 
board with the minimum required number of three supervisors (Clarke 2006). More importantly, 
the qualifications of the supervisory board members are another concern14 as most of the supervi- 
sors are more politically connected, for example, leaders of unions and political officers (Tenev, 
Zhang, and Brefort 2002; Dahya et al. 2003). Li (2010) argues that there is no effective legal 
environment or effective governance mechanism to protect investor and minority sharehold- 
ers in China. Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2014) conclude that enhancing the managerial expertise 
of controlling shareholders may result in a more effective corporate governance mechanism    
in China. 
To sum up, the Chinese governance mechanism combines the German model with the Anglo- 
Saxon model. This may create a conflict between boards of directors and supervisory boards 
leading to an overlap of duties and the monitoring role in particular. More importantly, it dilutes 
the power of both boards and increases directors’ and supervisors’ compensation schemes (CFA 
Institute 2007). Therefore, the governance mechanism followed by Chinese companies is a quasi- 
two-tier structure (CFA Institute 2007). Our results reveal the need for the regulator to reconsider 
the roles of either INEDs or the supervisory board members for – at least – listed companies or 
non-state-owned companies within a comprehensive reform of the Chinese governance mecha- 
nism. This is due to the clear conflict in the monitoring role between the supervisory board and 
the INEDs on the board of directors. 
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Notes 
1. http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_en.pdf. 
2. There was a total of 414 IPOs made in China over the period 2001–2008 with a total of RMB 508.6 billion being 
raised. Moreover, 345 and 278 IPOs were launched in the SSE and SZSE, respectively, during 2010–2011. For 
more detail, see Ernst and Young (2012), ‘Global IPO Trends Report 2010–2012: Prepare early, move fast’, and the 
websites of the SSE and SZSE. 
3. At the end of May 2013, 269 Chinese firms had withdrawn their IPO applications, whilst 666 firms had their IPO 
plans under review by the CSRC. 
4. The main responsibilities of the board of directors according to Article 46 of the Chinese Company law revised in 
2003 are: 
to convene the general meeting and to report on its work to the board of shareholders; to implement the resolu- 
tions of the general meeting; to decide on the business plans and investment plans of the company; to formulate 
the company’s proposed annual financial budgets and final accounts; to formulate the company’s profit distri- 
bution plans and plans for making up losses; to formulate plans for the company’s increase or reduction of the 
registered capital or for the issuance of corporate bonds; to formulate plans for the merger, division, dissolu- 
tion or change of corporate form of the company; to decide on the establishment of the company’s internal 
management organization; to decide on the employment or dismissal of the manager of the company and his 
remuneration, and to decide on the employment or dismissal of the deputy manager(s) and person(s) in charge of 
financial affairs of the company according to the recommendations of the manager and on their remuneration; to 
formulate the basic management system of the company; and other functions and powers specified in the articles 
of association of the company. (http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4814_0_7.html#_Toc381707446). 
5. http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4814_0_7.html. 
6. The System GMM estimator combines in a system the equation in first-differences with the same equation expressed 
in levels. 
7. Although this may cause the problem of weak instruments as the number of lags increases (Wintoki, Linck, and 
Netter 2012). However, we used different lag lengths as an empirical trade-off. 
8. The Guidelines for INEDs on the board of directors of listed companies states that ‘By June 30th, 2002, at        
least two members of the board of directors shall be independent directors; and by June 30th, 2003, at least        
one third of board shall be independent directors.’ For more details, see http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/ 
newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69191.html. 
9. We also control for the proportion of executive directors on the board of directors instead of INEDs as we believe that 
the monitoring role of the supervisory board may increase with the proportion of executive directors on the board of 
directors. We find that the proportion of executive directors on the board of directors is positively and significantly 
correlated with the supervisory board size. 
10. We also find consistent results with the monitoring hypothesis with respect to the supervisory board, however, for 
brevity and to save space, we did not present the results. 
11. We find similar results with respect to the monitoring and negotiation hypotheses. 
12. We find similar results with respect to the monitoring and negotiation hypotheses. 
13. We also use Newey West and random effects models and obtained similar results to those of the fixed effects models. 
14. According to the CFA Institute, the results of a survey conducted in 1999 reveal that supervisory boards’ members 
do not have the experience to supervise the board of directors. Moreover, they are not involved in the selection of 
board directors (CFA Institute 2007). 
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